How did NATO manage the Afghanistan campaign? I argue that the "classical narrative" of the war in Afghanistan, which explains shifts in strategy as an adjustment to shifting US interests, does not fully explain the political dynamics at play within the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) and NATO. The problem is not that the classical narrative is wrong, but rather that it only tells a limited aspect of the story.
Most scholarship on the Afghanistan war has focused on strategic debates such as the utility and effectiveness of a counter-insurgency (COIN) approach or the soundness of the strategic conceptions behind the overall campaign (Farrell and Chaudhuri, 2011; Bird and Marshall, 2011) . Research on multilateral war-fighting in Afghanistan observes that the United States' reliance on coalition partners grew over time, and explains this change by: the government structure and party politics of NATO allies or principal-agent problems (Auerswald and Saideman, 2014) ; the larger time horizon of the United States which had thus more incentives to seek multilateral cooperation (Kreps, 2012) ; or the evolution of the way institutional design facilitates multinational military cooperation (Weitsman, 2013) . However, few of these studies explain and illustrate how these incentives are translated into actual social dynamics and thus lead to outcomes. They often take for granted a linear relation between state's preferences, power distribution and political outcomes. In short, little is known about NATO's 2 management of the Afghanistan war. By this, I do not mean the tactical and operational dimension of the conduct of the military campaign by the ISAF, which is the subject of much analysis; instead, I mean the study of the social processes surrounding the political management of the campaign at the NATO headquarters (HQ) and capital's levels.
As members of an international organization, NATO allies transact their business in particular ways, and those ways shape outcomes. Specifically, I study the nature of NATO-ISAF's policymaking through a practice-based approach. How do allies agree or disagree on political decisions, and how does the specific social context within NATO influence such political events? This article analyzes the extent to which the conduct of the Afghanistan war is influenced by routine decision-making and procedural, linguistic and spatial practices at the NATO HQ, and illustrates the way practices shape the construction of the international security agenda. As such, this article contributes to the emerging scholarship aimed at bridging the gap between diplomatic studies and practice-based approaches to International Relations (Sending et al., 2015; Pouliot and Cornut, 2015) , by studying a case of military diplomacy (Bueger 2013; Bichi and Bremberg, 2016; Mérand and Rayroux, 2016) .
Studying NATO policy-making in the Afghan war: the practices of campaign management

The emergence of practices as a research agenda
Adler and Pouliot define practices as "socially meaningful patterns of action which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world" (2011a: 6). Practices have four main characteristics: they are a performance, are patterned, are interpreted along similar standards by groups of individuals and weave together the discursive and material world.
Surveys of the field identify a number of different traditions of practice-based research (Bueger and Gadinger, 2014; Pouliot and Cornut, 2015) , but there is a common minimal understanding of practices as socially meaningful patterns of activities. This article does not attempt to weigh-in on the debate by following one school or another. Instead, it uses practices as a "sensitizing concept" (Bueger and Gadinger, 2014: 78) for analyzing concrete empirical phenomena.
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Practices can be considered as explanandum and as explanans-as the result of some driving force or as a mechanism of social transformation. In this article, I document cases of both situations: I refer to cases of practices resulting from previous social dynamics (explanandum), but I also illustrate how practices made possible some political outcomes that would have been otherwise impossible (explanans). As explanans, practices can trigger change in three areas: "subjectivities (e.g. preferences, dispositions, or intentionality), in practice themselves, or in social orders (e.g. structures, domination patterns, or discourse)" (Adler and Pouliot, 2011b: 18) . The empirical portion of the paper distinguishes between practices considered as explanandum or as explanans.
Critics often claim that the causal power of practice is difficult to establish, as no single practice can single-handedly explain an event. In fact "strictly speaking, diplomatic practices do not 'cause' specific outcomes" (Pouliot and Cornut, 2015: 309) . It is better to conceive of practices as creating a context in which things become possible, and others become impossible: "causality works on this terrain not in terms of clearly identifiable causes but in terms of conditions of possibility" (Kuus, 2015: 380) . As such, it is pointless to require practices to explain a specific event (which is "caused" by a multiplicity of factors), but it is worth asking which practices made certain events possible, and how. The objective of the research is neither to give the ultimate explanation of all facets of the ISAF intervention, nor to pitch a practice-based approach as opposed to power-based or norms-based explanations. It is clear that power, norms and institutions are all important factors helping explain the ISAF mission.
Yet, the analytical plane is the different: the point is to illustrate how those practices gave the intervention its specific shape.
Studying practices within NATO
As an intergovernmental organization focused on military issues, NATO is composed of a number of bureaucratic routines and procedures. In particular, specific decision-making processes, which involve diplomats, military representatives and NATO civil servants are adopted and refined over time, and influence the conduct of the campaign. In their study of the Libyan intervention, Adler-Nissen and Pouliot (2014: 895) observe how power works in 4 practice. They identify three different dynamics: claiming competence occurs "when players seek to establish their mastery of the game by framing particular issues and positioning themselves as leaders"; social negotiation refers to "other players challeng[ing] the skillfulness of a player's moves as part of an ongoing struggle"; and wielding influence is when "Players cash out their socially recognized mastery in the form of non-coercive influence".
Below, I show how actors claimed competence, in particular the United States, and how this claim was challenged through various practices.
Other types of practices are also studied. First, while some practices involve military officers, most decision-making processes within NATO rely on diplomats. As Iver B. Neumann illustrates in his work, diplomats share a distinctive set of practices governing behavior: rituals, linguistic, stylized hospitality, etc. In particular, the diplomatic discourse is of great importance: "diplomats are specialists in meaning. They create, manipulate, convey and interpret words and symbolic actions. Such work is incomparably more complex than the mere conveying of messages, or even the negotiation of specific issues, though it encompasses both" (Gould-Davies, 2013 : 1465 . Hence, studying discourses and the use of language is particularly meaningful when studying the diplomatic work especially considering that the circulation of competing narratives about Afghanistan may have had a negative impact on the outcome of the intervention (Friis, 2012) .
There is also a spatial dimension to social activities. Iver B. Neumann has illustrated the idea that new diplomatic sites beyond the traditional conference table or press conference shape the reconfiguration of global diplomatic activities. Neumann argues that "the ever-increasing density of global life keeps changing the old, familiar diplomatic sites and creating new ones by bringing in agents, bringing on new procedures and dismantling old ones" (Neumann, 2013: 3). It is then appropriate to observe how the spatial dimension affects practices and thus contributes to the shaping of the social world when it comes to the Afghan war.
These three dimensions (routine procedures, language, space) are found simultaneously in any activity performed by the agents involved in the management of the Afghanistan war. Yet, for clarity purposes, they will serve as organizing devices in order to illustrate how practices operate: while I am "slicing up" different events according to these three dimensions in order 5 to document a specific practice, it must be remembered that these dimensions are always simultaneously at play.
Procedures
Language Space 
Practices as explenanda
NATO in Afghanistan: the classical narrative
After the 9/11 attacks, the United States and a coalition of allies overthrew the Taliban Forces (ANSF, comprising both the Army and the Police) to enable them to take the lead in ensuring national security by the end of 2014. In short, an increased US leadership and the other allies' willingness to take more risks resulted in greater strategic coherence. Whether this strategy will eventually prove to be successful remains to be seen (Woodward, 2010; Bird and Marshall, 2011; Chandrasekaran, 2012; Rynning, 2012; Fairweather, 2014; Bolger, 2014) .
There is wide agreement on the above narrative of NATO's campaign in Afghanistan. The problem with this narrative is that it considers the European NATO members' preferences as an adjustment to the shift in American preferences. As I will show in the analysis below, it tells only a limited part of the story. A focus on NATO practices enables us to open up and interrogate the decisions taken in the conduct of the Afghan campaign. In the remainder of this article, I first consider practices as explananda, and illustrate how the US representatives can more or less competently perform the various practices reflecting the American domination of the campaign, which lead to this power distribution favoring the United States to reach its full effect or not. I then turn to practices as explanans, showing how certain practices triggered a change in subjectivities, practices or social orders.
Practices as explananda: enacting the distribution of power within NATO
In this section, I illustrate how the United States and other states claim competence, in particular through the domination of specific procedural practice or their military contribution on the ground. These dynamics lead to a hierarchical conduct of the intervention within NATO.
Dominating the military campaign
There is little doubt that the Afghan campaign was dominated by the United States. The US was the major force provider on the battlefield, engaged in some of the toughest combat activities and was perceived by the local and regional actors as the key political interlocutor.
This predominance was translated in-and was the product of-a number of practices at the tactical/operational (ISAF, SHAPE) and strategic/political (NATO HQ) levels. The IMS provides the administrative support to the MC, and is the military counterpart to NATO's civilian staff.
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Interviews with BBC1, BBC2, BBF1, CBF2, CBG2.
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Interviews with CCF1, CCF2, AAE, BAG, DAG. 10 imbalance of power distribution favoring the United States is not automatically translated into a desired outcome: it has to be performed in a competent way by the relevant actors to show its full effect.
The political hierarchy
In addition to the military domination, American political leadership shaped, to a large extent, NATO's policy-making process. Policy decisions regarding the ISAF campaign (as well as other NATO operations) were made by one of the junior NATO committees, the Operations Plan Committee (OPC). As in every diplomatic circle, there was a hierarchy of status within the OPC, depending on the nations diplomats represented, their personal skills or their seniority within the committee. At NATO there was an established practice of "minority decision-making", which left responsibility for important decisions to a small number of countries. This practice took several forms. All interviewees agreed that the key players in the OPC were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and to a lesser degree Germany and Italy. The Netherlands, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Turkey and Australia belonged to a second circle of important nations. This means that out of 50 nations composing the ISAF, only 10 to 11 regularly spoke during the OPC meetings and actually shaped policy decisions. Some nations, be it because of a lack of diplomatic manpower or out of interest, did not even attend most of the OPC meetings. There is then a clear hierarchical relationship at the NATO HQ between nations, ranging from a small group of pro-active nations effectively shaping policies and a larger group that remained silent. This observation is consistent with and reinforces the observation that "the alliance's decision rules would seem to encourage deal-making by powerful and/or passionate members who want to get their way" (Auerswald and Saideman, 2014: 35) . Not only did decision-making rules favor powerful and/or passionate members, they also reified a social hierarchy within the OPC that was based on military contributions, and being a "good ally" (Pouliot: 2016). As was described by one diplomat from a small European country: "everyone knows his place: we do not expect a country to make an inflammatory statement when its military contribution is close to zero" 7 . Some countries were expected to shape the outcomes, while others were expected to remain silent. This indicates that the formal hierarchy within the OPC is a function of the social recognition that comes with significant contributions on the ground.
The NATO bureaucracy also contributed to this hierarchical management of the campaign.
The real power of NATO's bureaucratic structure lies in the fact that NATO civil servants draft the documents that will subsequently be discussed by the OPC and the NAC. Drafters are usually very careful to accommodate nations' concerns before the document is circulated to them, and key nations are then associated to the drafting process. However, civil servants know all nations' preferences whereas an individual nation is typically uncertain about the others' intentions: this asymmetry of information is in favor of the civil servant, who can exploit it to advance his own preferences while still being seen as a neutral expert figure 8 .
There was a habit of coordinating with key allies before the OPCs: the informal hierarchy of the decision-making process was then made explicit through the selective consultation of key nations. Interestingly, this consultation of key nations was not supposed to take place because this would acknowledge a hierarchy while NATO, like other international organizations, is based on the fiction of legal equality among member states. In fact, everybody knew that such meetings took place, but nobody mentioned them. Not mentioning these meetings is in itself a sign that keeping the fiction is important for NATO cohesion, hence showing that this cohesion is valued by the member states. There is then an established practice of leaving a minority of countries to handle policy decisions, either at the OPC or during the pre-OPC meetings, which all actors are aware of, but which shall not be named.
Among this minority of countries, the US was widely considered the most influential: this is another example of the practice of American primacy. The US have been the driving force within the OPC and the NAC regarding policy developments on topics such as strategic partnerships with Afghanistan, the size and format of the ANSF, funding schemes for the Afghan government or the post-ISAF operation. When drafting documents, the US proposal was routinely the first to be welcomed by the chairman, who then invited reactions from other countries. Implicitly, this prioritization of the US proposal over those of other nations' both represented and reproduced the American position as a primus inter pares.
The ability of American policy-makers to perform their leadership role in the Afghan campaign, suggesting policy developments at the NAC or OPC level, facilitated the acceptation of this domination by other countries. Yet, American representatives can perform their role more or less competently. For example, after a round of negotiations during which the American delegate did not seem to pay much attention to the proposal of a small European country's delegate (although this delegate obviously had high hopes about his suggestion), the same delegate exceptionally asked to speak first during the next meeting in order to reiterate the same proposal which then constituted the basis for further discussions. Here, the incompetent performance of the practice of American primacy at the negotiating table by the American delegate led to another round of negotiations, in which the US representative was in an unfavorable situation as her proposal was not the first to be discussed and was, in fact, substantially transformed.
A linguistic practice reveals the underlying dynamics of coalition warfare. NATO is officially a bilingual institution, and work can be carried out in both French and English. In practice, since the arrival of Eastern European countries whose representatives usually don't speak French, English has become the dominating working idiom. Yet, the French representatives (who are instructed to speak French) continue to use it during the OPC and NAC meetings. Other representatives, coming from countries such as Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium or Turkey usually have a good command of French. Interestingly, depending on the position they want to advocate, such representatives will switch from English to French or back to English.
All is determined by the position of the US representative. If those countries agree with it, they will express their agreement (or minor suggestions) in English. If they have a strong disagreement, they will express it in French, thus forcing the majority of diplomats around the table (including the US representatives whose command of French is usually minimal) to use the services of the live translation. What might appear as first glance as purely anecdotal is in fact significant because it is an example of the way the US domination of the campaign is either accepted or challenged. Speaking English is for those countries an acceptation of the framing of an issue by the US, while speaking French is a way to challenge the American preferred 13 policy positions. Moreover, this practice of bilingualism also formalizes an informal hierarchy between countries capable of formulating propositions in different languages and countries only able to speak English. It is no surprise that representatives able to speak both French and English usually come from countries deemed important within NATO (France, Italy, Germany, Turkey).
In terms of spatial practices, the observation of the NAC meetings revealed interesting dynamics. Because the ISAF comprised more than 40 different nations, meetings cannot be held in the traditional NAC meeting room, which would be too small. Thus, the meetings were located in a second meeting room, large enough to accommodate everyone. In addition to space at the table, it was also necessary to accommodate staffers (junior diplomats, etc.), but also the NATO civil servants who have an interest in attending the meeting. A number of seats behind each ambassador were reserved for staff from his/her own delegation, and NATO civil servants were supposed to sit on the non-reserved places. Yet, the sitting location embodied the hierarchized conduct of the Afghanistan campaign. First, not all nations had an equal number of seats assigned for staffers, although it should officially have been the case. Major nations (US, UK, France, Germany, etc.) received more assigned seats than others, thus physically showing the unofficial hierarchy at play. This practice derived from the pragmatic observation made by NATO staff that some countries had more staffers than others, and thus needed more seats. The NATO staff in charge of preparing the NAC meeting room are purely logistical and administrative assistants. Hence, it is particularly telling that they decided on their own initiative to adapt the spatial repartition of the NAC room to what they perceived was needed in order to facilitate the meetings, without realizing that they were breaking the NATO regulation stipulating that each country must have an equal amount of seats 9 : the reification of the social hierarchy at play in the conduct of the Afghanistan war has a spatial dimension which is both perceived and reproduced by the NATO logistical staff. It is even more interesting to observe that state representatives and NATO civil servants noticed this progressive rearrangement, without anyone complaining about it: the hierarchical nature of the policy-making process was translated into spatial practices, which in turn helped reinforce this social stratification. 9 Interviews with the logistical staff at NATO. 14 Considering practices as explenanda helps understanding how the imbalance of the distribution of power operates by reifying a hierarchy of social status, but also illustrates that the translation of the imbalance of power in outcome is far from automatic: US representatives have to competently perform their roles for their power advantage to achieve its full effect, and this unequal distribution of power can be challenged and circumvented in original ways. (Moore, 2007 ). NATO's bureaucratic structure adjusted to these new incentives, and the operations division started to grow in terms of numbers of employees and in terms of pro-activity: more and more proposals for change and reform (especially regarding expeditionary capabilities) began to circulate within the HQ 10 .
Practices as explanans
Going to war
In the meantime, in 2003, governments suddenly realized that the ISAF was running out of nations willing to take the lead. The first two nations to have assumed command of ISAF, the United Kingdom and Turkey, had deployed their own national divisional headquarters.
However, Germany and the Netherlands, who took over ISAF command from Turkey in February 2003 and were supposed to assume it until August, wanted to deploy their NATO-15 assigned multinational corps headquarters. According to Rynning (2012: 86-87) , "Unless NATO stepped in, force generation and coordination, logistics, and operational command would all fall on the two host nations. They thus asked for NATO's help". This political desire by Germany and the Netherlands to involve NATO crossed paths with an established practice within NATO HQ: the sharing of information about the ISAF mission.
Only NATO countries had assumed command of the ISAF, and it had become usual for the UK and Turkey to report to their NATO colleagues in formal settings (such as the NATO Atlantic Council, NAC) or in informal discussions on their own initiatives: the ISAF not being a NATO operation at the time, no formal procedure required them to do so. This practice of informing allies created a habit of discussing ISAF issues within NATO, thus facilitating the transition to a NATO-led ISAF. The practice of reporting to the NAC and informing other NATO members of the nuts and bolts of managing the ISAF mission reified background knowledge on the opportunity of "out-of-area" operations by showing that it was, indeed, possible. Several interviews with diplomats from key NATO nations confirmed that they regularly reported to their capitals the positive impression about ISAF they had from their Turkish and British colleagues. I was shown by representatives of two of those countries the internal confidential documents advocating for NATO taking over ISAF that were addressed to their ministries of Defense and ministries of Foreign Affairs. Both of them mention the positive portraying of the ISAF mission at the NAC level by the UK and Turkey as an argument in favor of NATO taking over, and it seems likely that other countries' internal documents mention a similar argument.
What matters here is the fact that the practice of reporting to the NAC (although NATO was not yet engaged in Afghanistan) weaved together the discursive and the material world about out-of-area operations: while all NATO member-states were debating out-of-area operations, Turkey and the UK were actually conducting one and gave other allies a glance of what such operations would look like. In this case, the practice of reporting created a condition of possibility: it seems very likely that the NAC would have been much more reluctant to take command of the ISAF without the flattering picture displayed by the UK and Turkey 11 .
11 Interviews with CCF1, CCF2, AAE, AAF, BAG, DBG, DAG. This finding is important, because it complements the purely power-based explanation of the decision to engage NATO in Afghanistan. The decision to go to Afghanistan is thus the result of a combination of political incentives (reconciling both sides of the Atlantic after the Iraq crisis and using NATO's help in the case of Germany and the Netherlands) and a favorable context. This context consisted of a more intervention-prone organization that was already familiarized with ISAF through the practice of reporting to the NAC. This does not dismiss the political incentives that drove NATO in Afghanistan, but practices explain the establishment of the context that made possible the adoption of such a decision.
Defining a strategy for NATO
Summits are an important moment in NATO's life. They are an opportunity for heads of states and governments to meet and to provide strategic guidance to the alliance. Ministers of defense or ministers of Foreign Affairs meet on a more regular basis ("ministerials", in NATO parlance), but summits are the real pulse of the Alliance: a relatively short moment (usually two days), prepared months in advance by capitals and NATO's bureaucracy, during which important decisions are made. It has all the elements of a classical tragedy (unity of time, space and action) as well as a bit of drama: key issues that could not be solved at the levels of diplomats or ministers are held into reserve for the summit. Summits guide the alliance's work and direct energies within the HQ for at least six months before the event 12 .
I am focusing here on the linguistic practice of surprise announcements by Afghan President Hamid Karzai. In application of a carefully crafted protocol, the Afghan President was the first to speak during the summit sessions devoted to ISAF, and his introductory remarks were followed by NATO Secretary-General's speech, before turning to the Senior Civilian 
Negotiating ISAF
As mentioned, NATO decision-making procedures reify a hierarchy of states, and reward the most pro-active countries, as well as those more committed on the ground. This had an impact on the role Australia, New Zealand or Sweden started to play in both the OPC and the NAC.
Through a recognized commitment on the ground and a valued contribution to policy developments, these countries managed to be considered as almost equals to the NATO allies in terms of prerogatives and status. For example, while in 2006 it was standard procedure for 13 Interviews with CCE2, CAB, BBE. 14 I do not reveal the content of such "surprises" as interviewees have requested to keep it secret until the official opening of archives. 15 During which President Karzai felt that the United States were favoring his rivals Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah NATO allies to discuss and agree on policy papers in a "NATO-members only" format first, and then discuss it with partners, this habit gradually evolved and partners were routinely (Schmitt, 2015) . This illustrates how practices established in the ISAF context were carried on in an other intervention by those already enacting them (OPC and NAC members), thus facilitating the swift inclusion of Qatar and Jordan in the NATO machinery. But this practice also had an effect on the partners, and is probably connected to the close links Sweden and Australia currently enjoy with NATO, Sweden even discussing membership in light of the current Russian behavior.
The way issues were framed and negotiations conducted also had an impact on the final political outcome. One of the most defining features of any policy document agreed upon by the OPC or the NAC is the extent to which a specific text is "recycled" from other policy documents. Because multilateral diplomacy with more than 40 countries is difficult, it is a standard practice to cut bits and pieces of already agreed-upon policy documents in order to avoid endlessly reopening contentious issues. As such, it is very frequent to hear diplomats explain: "this is already agreed-upon text" when they are suggesting modifications to a document under negotiation. "Already agreed-upon text" is supposed to be the magic formula avoiding endless and repetitive debates. Because the Afghanistan war has produced several 16 Interview with DBC1.
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hundred policy documents over the years, it is not unusual to find a specific formulation that suits a specific state's preference. And the practice is not limited to NATO policy documents: diplomats routinely refer to texts adopted under the framework of the United Nations for example. The craft of the diplomat is then her capability to master a large body of policy documents and extract the specific formulation that would favor her state's political preferences while in the meantime presenting this formulation as consensual, since it is supposed to be "already agreed upon language". Of course, other diplomats are engaged in the same activity, and the OPC meetings are often a battle for the perpetual re-definition of the meaning of past documents to suit the needs of the present.
This practice of "copy-pasting" from other documents has consequences. Documents are reinterpreted to suit a diplomat's purpose, but the frame for re-interpretation is limited (not every meaning can be attached to any word), which thus constraints the way issues are framed, and has political consequences for the political management of the campaign. process. Yet, the Norwegian representative insisted on the fact that this language was drawn from the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, and that it was as such "already agreed-upon language" which carried strong political importance: this is how para. 9 made its way to the final communiqué, and is now used by women's rights organizations in their campaigns. Similarly, para. 6 mentions the following sentence: "(…) ISAF shifts from focusing primarily on combat increasingly to the provision of training, advice and assistance to the ANSF (…)" (NATO, 2012: 6). ISAF's role during the transition to Afghan-led security was heavily discussed and no consensus could be found on the degree of assistance it should provide: some countries wanted to keep an active role including combat missions while others were more reluctant and wanted to take the transition as an opportunity to withdraw their troops. 20 The compromise was found in recycling the language "provision of training, advice and assistance to the ANSF" from a policy document related to the NATO Training MissionAfghanistan (NTM-A), which was deemed vague enough to accommodate everyone. But this language suggests a continuous involvement in the ISAF in one way or another and, for example, played a role in France's decision to keep a number of trainers in Afghanistan despite the withdrawal of the combat forces after President Hollande's election in 2012 17 : the recycled language was more committing than initially thought by some nations. Numerous classified documents are negotiated in similar ways, and it thus critical to take into account the "shadow of the past" when analyzing documents produced by NATO, as the practice of recycling "already-agreed upon language" has political consequences. Union. This would also contribute to the research agenda studying the overlap, similarities and interactions between the two institutions. Finally, adopting a practice approach could facilitate the exchange of knowledge between scholars and policy-makers by creating a common frame of reference for further discussions, including opening the possibility of critical dialogues between both communities.
Conclusion
